Valuing Children’s Health and Life: What Does Economic Theory Say About Including Parental and Societal Willingness To Pay? by Harbaugh, William
Valuing Children’s Health and Life:  
What Does Economic Theory Say About Including  






William T. Harbaugh 
Department of Economics 
University of Oregon 
















Abstract:  Governments can and do adopt many policies that will improve the health and reduce 
the mortality risks of children. Given this, estimates of the value of improvements in children’s 
health and reductions in their mortality risk are needed so that governments can rationally choose 
which of the many possible policies to adopt. These estimates should be based on an appropriate 
measure of value that is based on  economic theory. This paper examines what economic theory 
has to say about what sorts of elements should be counted in that value, and how that value 
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Valuing Children’s Health and Life:  
What Does Economic Theory Say About Including  
Parental and Societal Willingness To Pay? 
 
 
1.  Introduction: 
 
Governments can adopt many policies that will improve the health and reduce the 
mortality risks of children. Given this, estimates of the value of improvements in children’s 
health and reductions in their mortality risk are needed so that governments can rationally choose 
which of the many possible policies to adopt and how far to pursue them. These estimates should 
be based on an appropriate measure of value that is based on economic theory. This paper 
examines what economic theory has to say about what sorts of elements should be counted in 
that value, and how that value should then be used in decision-making. 
The paper begins with a discussion of the various reasons why children’s own 
willingness to pay (WTP) is unacceptable as a measure of value. I first ignore altruism by parents 
and other adults. I present short discussions of young children’s psychological inability to 
imagine death, their generally high discount rates, the high degree of risk-taking behavior in 
adolescents, and the short time horizons of both children and adolescents. I argue that these 
preference related issues mean that own WTP for health and safety improvements are poor 
measures of the true benefits of these goods to children. I show that an additional difficulty arises 
from children’s inability to borrow against future income.  
I argue that these aspects of children’s preferences and budget constraints can lead them 
to make decisions which can be Pareto improved on by a social planner. That is, even if parents 
and non-related adults are not altruistic, it may be possible for government to adopt policies that 
alter the voluntary decisions of children in ways that make some of the children, parents, and 
other adults better off and none worse off. I show how own WTP should be altered in order to 
provide the information necessary for such decisions.  
I then focus on what I believe is a more significant question: how to account for the 
altruistic feelings that parents and other members of society have for the health and safety of 
children. It is commonly argued that parents and to a lesser extent society in general have a 
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legitimate interest in children’s welfare. In practice, parents almost universally provide their 
children with far more health and safety than they would voluntarily consume. While the effect is 
usually less extreme, society also tends to provide children with more of these goods than their 
families would voluntarily provide, and in “dysfunctional” cases this effect can also be very 
large. It is much rarer (though not unheard of - adults often believe that some degree of risk 
taking is part of growing up) for parents to insist that children are being too safe, or for society to 
take the opinion that parents are being overprotective. 
While I have argued above that part of this protective behavior may be explained by a 
model where decisions are made by benevolent planners, rather than by altruism in the usual 
sense, altruism is also an important, and potentially more important factor. How altruistic 
preferences should be correctly incorporated into policy decisions is not obvious. 
For the purposes of this paper two kinds of distinctions in altruistic preferences are 
relevant. The first is that between non-paternalistic and paternalistic altruism. In the former the 
utility of one person (the child) is an argument in the utility of another (the adult.)  In the latter it 
is the level of consumption of a particular good by the child, say safety, that enters the 
preferences of the adult.  This distinction is potentially important.  Others have shown that, under 
certain circumstances, if parents care about the utility of children, then incorporating adults WTP 
for children’s safety can result in more safety than is socially optimal. I examine the 
reasonableness of the assumptions on which this result is based and how sensitive this conclusion 
is to those assumptions. For example, I assume that there is some constraint on cash transfers to 
children, and look at second best solutions. There are obvious reasons why in multi-period 
models parents may prefer not to make cash transfers to children, even if they really care about 
the utility of their children.  
The second distinction is between pure and impure altruism.  Pure altruism is where the 
level of utility or consumption of the child enters the adult’s utility. Both the non-paternalistic 
and the non-paternalistic cases above would be examples of pure altruism. Impure altruism is 
where the amount of the adult’s contribution to the child’s utility or consumption enters the 
donor’s utility. This might be either because the donor feels good when he donates, or because he 
gets some benefit when other people notice he has donated.  
It is well established that impure altruism is an important explanation for donations to 




also true for contributions by adults to charities that help children. It is an open question as to 
whether parent’s support of their own children is an example of pure or impure altruism.  
I address the question of how preferences that incorporate impure altruism will affect WTP for 
the well-being of another, and how measures of WTP that include impure altruism should be 
used in making policy decisions.  
 
 
2: Some Simple Problems with Own Willingness to Pay: 
  
 Although there is no ideal measure, economists generally agree that for the purposes of 
conducting benefit-cost analysis and making policy decisions the amount that a person is willing 
to pay to acquire a good is a useful measure of the good’s value. In later sections of this paper I 
will discuss what happens to the validity of this measure if people other than the purchaser care 
about how much of it the purchaser consumes. The purpose of this section is to argue that - even 
ignoring externalities and altruism - this measure should not be applied to reductions in 
children’s mortality and morbidity rates.  
 
 
Different conceptions of what death means. 
 
One argument is that young children simply lack the ability to imagine death. Carey 
(1985, pp. 13-40 and 60-65) reviews the psychological literature and finds a consensus that there 
are three stages in children’s understanding of death. Until age 5 or so, children typically see 
death as a form of sleep, and while they see it as painful, because it involves separation from 
parents, they do not understand that it involves an final end to the body’s biological processes.  
For example, they ask questions such as “How do dead people go to the bathroom?” and they 
speak of the need to whisper when talking at funerals to avoid waking up the deceased.  
Elementary age children do understand that death is terminal, but not that it is an inevitable 
biological fact.  They often attribute the death of a person described as bad to that person's bad 




and falls and cancer can kill a person, and that once dead they aren’t coming back. By about age 
9 or 10, children seem to understand death as adults do.  
It seems likely that children not only do not understand death as adults do, but that they 
do not understand that their conception of death is going to change in a way that makes death 
more unacceptable. Since death is irreversible, this means that we can argue that a child’s WTP 
for a given reduction in the probability of death will be a downward biased measure of the true 
benefits to them of that reduction.  
 
 
Changes in Discounting and Risk Aversion 
 
A similar problem arises because children and adolescents discount the future at high 
rates (Krause and Harbaugh, 1998).  Again, it seems likely that children do not understand that 
their discount rates will decline as they grow older, though the evidence on this is less 
conclusive. If they are faced with giving up current consumption for future increases in health or 
decreases in the risk of death, and if they fail to realize that their discount rate will decline, they 
will discount these improvements at the current rate instead of at a rate that declines with age. 
Again, this will mean that own WTP for safety improvements will undervalue the true benefits of 
the improvements.  
On the other hand, if given a chance to trade off their current (but not future) health for 
increased future consumption, children will underestimate the value of future consumption, and 
presumably choose too much current health. Unfortunately, children seem to have relatively 
more opportunities of the first sort.  
While risk aversion also seems to increase with age, and adolescents are well know for 
their willingness to take far greater risks to health than adults will accept, changes in risk 
aversion are probably not the source of problems of the above sort. This is because risks are 
typically one shot affairs. Adults are not forced to repeat the sorts of risks that they take as 
children. One exception might be addictions.  Adolescents might be willing to take the chances 
that, say, cigarette smoking entails, while adults are not.  However, once addicted, the adult may 
essentially be stuck continuing to accept repeated risks of heath damage that he would be 








Restricted Access to Credit 
 
Even if there were no problems of the sorts described above, and children were able to 
make fully rational choices, another difficulty arises because children's current incomes are very 
low relative to their permanent incomes.  Legal prohibitions on their rights to sign contracts 
make it essentially impossible for them to borrow against their future earnings. This means that, 
in the common situation where the cost must be paid now and the health benefits or risk 
reduction come later, children would be unable to borrow to make optimal choices, given their 
preferences. The simple solution to this problem would be to remove the borrowing constraint, 
but the costs of doing this will be large, if the sorts of problems described above do exist. 
 
 
3.  Should Social Planners Try to Improve on the Decisions of Children? 
 
The above issues suggest the possibility of Pareto improving changes in children's own 
choices regarding health and safety, even if we ignore the possibility that adults are actually 
altruistic towards children. This is slightly different from the usual situation where the social 
planner’s approach is used.  The typical setup is the case where one person’s actions affect 
another’s. While these children are making bad decisions, those decisions are only affecting 
themselves (again ignoring altruism). 
Still, it seems clear that in every case considered in section 2 above, it is possible at least 
in theory to construct a Pareto improvement. For example, consider the under-investment in 
activities that increase future health, caused by temporarily high discount rates.  The social 
planner needs only to borrow and make the investments for the child, then have the child pay 
pack the loans when older.  
In short, I am arguing that it’s possible to give plausible normative and positive 




This is important because it suggests that the interference in children’s decisions we do observe 
may not solely be the result of altruism, where that is defined as an adult’s willingness to 
sacrifice his own consumption for that of a child’s. As we will see below the question of how to 
include WTP that is derived from altruistic preferences is complicated.  I believe this adds 
another layer of complication, requiring that empirical efforts to measure WTP for children’s 
safety must also determine the motives behind that WTP. 
 
 
4.  Altruism.  
 
In this section I address the question of how to account for the altruistic feelings that 
parents and other members of society have for the health and safety of children. For expositional 
purposes I will often take the (hopefully) oversimplified point of view that these altruistic 
feelings all run in one direction, from adults to children. I will also often assume that adults are 
more altruistic toward their own children than to other children. These conventions will make it 
more obvious as to how the theory, which was often developed for more general purposes, 
applies to the question at hand.  I should note that there are models of the evolutionary 
development of altruism, described in Bergstrom 1996 and Sober and Wilson 1998, that predict 
these sorts of preferences. 
For the purposes of this paper two kinds of distinctions in altruistic preferences are 
relevant. First is the distinction between non-paternalistic and paternalistic altruism. Non-
paternalistic altruism means that the altruist cares about the well-being of other people as those 
other people define their well-being. In other words the utility of the other person is an argument 
in the altruists utility function. Paternalistic altruism means that the altruist cares about some 
particular aspect of a person's well being, not their utility. For our purposes that something will 
generally be safety.  
It has been shown that, under certain circumstances, if people are non-paternalistically 
altruistic, then incorporating their WTP for the safety of others will result in more safety than is 
socially optimal. I examine the reasonableness of the assumptions on which this result is based, 
how sensitive this conclusion is to those assumptions, and how applicable this result is to the 




The second distinction is that between pure and impure altruism. Impure altruism is an 
important explanation for donations to charities and for contributions to small groups in 
experimental settings. It seems almost certain that this motive is also an important one for 
contributions by adults to charities that help children. It is an open question as to whether 
parent’s support of their own children is an example of pure or impure altruism. I address the 
question of how preferences that incorporate impure altruism will affect WTP for the well-being 




4.1 Non-paternalistic and paternalistic altruism. 
 
 In this subsection I review work by others on the appropriate way to include WTP for 
reductions in the mortality and morbidity rates of others.  I show that in general it is not 
sufficient to just look at revealed or reported WTP, and that instead it is necessary to understand 






 Bergstrom (1982) proved what at first glance seems to be a rather astonishing result about 
how non-paternalistic altruism affects the socially optimal level of safety. With a few relatively 
innocuous assumptions he shows that the conditions for the Pareto optimal level of public safety 
are the same whether people care about others or not.  
 The intuition is very simple if we view safety as a private good. Safety is expensive and 
providing it means someone must consume less of some other good. If that someone is the 
recipient, he gets less consumption and more safety than he would have voluntarily consumed, 
and so is worse off than before. Since the altruist cares about the recipient’s utility, he is also 




So suppose the altruist pays for the safety. The recipient is better off because he has more 
safety, a good he cares about. The altruist is better off because of the increase in the well-being 
of someone he cares about, but worse off because of the decrease in his own consumption. It’s 
not clear if this is a Pareto improvement, but it can be shown that it’s not Pareto optimal. 
Suppose that the altruist gives the recipient cash equal to the cost of the safety, instead of 
safety.  The recipient would then buy the amount of safety that maximizes his utility. This would 
leave the recipient with no less utility than before, and assuming the marginal utility of 
consumption was positive, with more utility. Since the altruist cares about the recipient’s utility 
he'd be better off with this larger utility increase than he would be with the smaller increase he 
got by giving safety. So there's a way to make everybody better off: redistribute money and let 
people by the amount of safety they find optimal, that is where there WTP equals the marginal 
cost of provision. This is just the standard argument for transfers of money rather than goods.  
Bergstrom extends it to the situation where safety is a non-rival good. The argument is 
essentially the same: if we provide more safety than is optimal by the usual Samuelson rule, 
people must be consuming less of others goods than is optimal. So increasing a person's safety 
beyond the amount people would voluntarily buy cannot be Pareto optimal. This is not to say it's 
bad, just that we can do better.  
In the context of the question of how to account for parental and social valuations of  
children's safety, this result says that society should not provide children with anymore safety 
than children would voluntarily buy themselves, since we could always do better by 
redistributing income instead. In the context of this paper, which is concerned with the question 
of how to value improvements in children's health, the implication is that, if we are trying to 
achieve the efficient amount of safety, we should use the child's own value and not add a term 
for their parents willingness to pay for safety.   
Note that this is not quite the same as saying that the socially optimal quantity of 
children’s safety, with parental or societal altruism, is the same as the level that would be optimal 
without that altruism. Instead, we are saying that the marginal conditions for optimality are the 
same. If benevolent altruists transfer money to children, then so long as safety is a normal good, 






But what if the altruists are paternalistic? 
 
There are several difficulties with using this result as a prescription for what should and 
should not count in benefit cost analysis. First, there is abundant evidence, beginning with the 
very origin of the word paternalistic, that parents, and society in general, are concerned with 
children's safety, and not their utility. In such a situation Jones-Lee (1991) shows that it is correct 
to consider all the altruist’s WTP for the recipient’s safety when determining the socially optimal 
level of safety.  
Some intuition for this result is as follows.  First, suppose we ignore the altruist’s WTP in 
setting the recipient’s safety. Now consider a slight increase in safety. This makes the recipient 
better off, since his safety goes up, and it also makes the altruist better off, for the same reason.  
Continue this process until the altruist’s WTP is fully incorporated into the decision to buy 
safety, that is so he is no longer willing to pay for more safety.  
Can we find a Pareto improvement to this situation? Obviously we can’t make the altruist 
better off unless we can somehow induce the recipient to increase his consumption of safety even 
more. But we are already providing the recipient with more safety than he was willing to buy 
voluntarily. Again, this logic is developed for the case where safety is a private good, but the 
conclusion also holds if it is non-rival.  
 
 
An explanation for why WTP from non-paternalistic altruists should count too. 
 
In this part of the paper I argue that an important assumption of the Bergstrom model is 
unlikely to apply to the case of parents and children. As a result I will argue that, even when 
parents are non-paternalistic altruists, it is appropriate to include some portion of their WTP for 
safety into the calculation of the socially optimal amount of safety. 
Bergstrom assumes that transfers of money to children and transfers of goods are equally 
expensive. However, if it is cheaper to transfer a particular good, say safety, to a recipient than it 
is to transfer cash, the Bergstrom result no longer holds. For example, suppose that it costs $3 to 




clearly it is no longer always possible to create a Pareto improvement to a safety transfer by 
making a cash transfer instead.  
Arguably, the most important reason why it is expensive to transfer cash to children is the 
distortions that the prospect of these transfers create. While at first glance it might seem obvious 
that cash transfers to children will distort their behavior, the issue is actually rather subtle. 
Becker’s (1981) well known rotten-kid theorem showed that there are plausible circumstances 
where, rather than cause children to distort their behavior in inefficient ways, cash transfers can 
actually cause them to act efficiently.  
Suppose that the parent is an altruist who is going to make a cash transfer to the child. 
The child knows this, and knows that this transfer is going to be an increasing function of the 
parent’s wealth. By choosing actions that maximize that wealth, the child will maximize the 
transfer. So in this situation the prospect of a cash transfer from the altruistic parent actually 
serves to reduce inefficient distortions in the child’s behavior.  
The problems with this argument are both empirical and theoretical.  Peters et al. (1997) 
in an ingenious experiment with family members show that children simply do not behave this 
way towards their parents. Either they don’t understand the game, or they don’t believe their 
parents are altruists. The second problem is that under more realistic assumptions the theoretical 
prediction no longer holds. 
Bergstrom (1989) shows the rotten-kid theorem only holds in restrictive circumstances.  
One of several ways that cash transfers can produce distortions is if the child can commit to 
actions before the adult, as Bergstrom shows in a two-period model. Suppose that in period 1 the 
child has a choice between consuming $1 and investing it in a way that will increase the family’s 
period 2 earnings by $1(1 + r). The child knows that his altruistic parent will divide the second 
parent income up between the parent and the child, so the child has a choice of $1 now or a 
portion of the $1(1 + r), later.  Suppose that r is greater than the child’s and the parent’s discount 
rates, so that it is efficient to make the investment. If the portion of family income that the parent 
intends to share is small enough, it is quite possible the child will prefer not to make this 
investment, even though doing so would be efficient.  
Bruce and Waldman (1990 and 1991) further develop this idea in a way that is relevant to 
the question of safety. They develop a two-period model like Bergstrom’s, and use it to show 




Their explanation is similar to Bergstrom’s argument above and is explicitly based on 
Buchanan's (1975) "Samaritan's Dilemma," which was concerned with the adverse incentives of 
welfare programs. The dilemma for the parents is that if they promise their children a future cash 
transfer that is inversely related to the child's future wealth, they will induce children to work 
less than is optimal, and also to under invest in activities that increase their productivity. The 
intuition they give is that by spending more now and less in the future, children increase the 
marginal utility of future consumption, and this higher marginal utility will induce altruistic 
parents to increase their transfer.  This distortion is inefficient.  
Bruce and Waldman argue that parents can avoid this inefficiency by giving their 
children an in-kind transfer instead. They argue that the ideal good is one that forces the children 
to increase their savings, and they use education and down payments on a home as good 
examples. Children would like to convert these gifts to cash, spend the cash on current 
consumption, and then collect higher last period transfers from their parents, but the nature of 
these particular sorts of gifts makes this very difficult. 
A similar and perhaps even stronger story could be told about morbidity. Children 
naturally, and generally correctly, believe that their parents will take care of them if they are 
injured or get sick. Suppose that a child with these beliefs is given the opportunity to sacrifice $1 
of consumption now, in order to get a reduction in morbidity with a present value of  $2 to the 
parent and the child. Obviously , it would be optimal to make the sacrifice. But, suppose the 
child knows that if they consume the $1 now, their parents will increase their future bequest, 
since they will be poorer in the future, and that if after not buying the safety they do get injured, 
their parents will take care of them. In such a situation children will obviously have an incentive 
to consume rather than invest that is even stronger than that which occurs with regular 
investments. 
Note that the situation with risks to life is somewhat different than that of risks to health. 
Parents cannot make second period transfers to their children that can compensate them for 
death, as they can for injury and illness. Because of his, children will have no particular incentive 
to consume too little of forms of safety that specifically reduce death.  Since in practice risks of 
morbidity and of mortality are correlated, this means that the problem of children under-




Applying Bruce and Waldman’s results to the case of safety has shown that children will 
tend to under-invest in safety to an even greater extent than in other things. This provides a 
justification for policies that increase safety above the amount that children will purchase 
voluntarily. The question is how far to go. Since both parents and society in general may be 
making second period cash transfers to children, both will be in a situation where their transfers 
are distorting behavior, and both will conceivable be in a situation to implement policies to 
increase children’s safety.  
For simplicity, I will assume that there is only one altruist, the parent. The analysis will 
be similar with more than one. We want to know how we should use the child’s and the parent’s 
WTP for safety in determining the optimal level of safety.  First, recall that the fact that the 
altruists are making second period cash transfers causes the recipient to choose less safety than 
would otherwise be optimal, even if the altruist’s preferences are ignored. So it is clear that there 
is scope for the altruist to do as Bruce and Waldman recommend and increase the provision of 
safety. The question is how far, and in particular should the quantity decision also incorporate 
the parent’s WTP?  
As argued above, for Bergstrom’s result that we should ignore the altruist’s WTP for 
safety to hold it must be possible to transfer money at the same cost as safety. Is that possible 
here? We already know that, because he cannot pre-commit to a transfer, the cash transfers from 
the parent will be distortionary. The question is, can the government do any better? In practice, 
we would have to say no. For example, neither SSI payments, Medicare, or Medicaid benefits 
discriminate against those whose conditions are the result of their own decisions, such as 
smoking or riding a motorcycle without a helmet.  
Interestingly, if the government could pre-commit to a transfer, this would still not 
necessarily eliminate the distortionary effects. Parents still might undo the governments 
commitment by adjusting their own transfer to reflect the recipient’s marginal utility of second 
period income. 
So, I argue that in the two period model, the WTP for safety of parent’s and other 
altruists, generally should be considered when making decisions about how much public safety 
to provide children, even if the altruists have entirely non-paternalistic motives. This is contrary 




parent’s purchases of private safety or use CV questions about public safety.  In either case, the 
estimated WTP should be used in government decision-making. 
While the Bergstrom / Jones-Lee results are interesting, they do not apply under what I 
believe are the most realistic conditions. The Bruce and Waldman (1990) assumptions are more 
realistic, and they give a contradictory result. The conclusion for pure altruism is that, when 
determining the socially optimal level of safety, we should include even non-paternalistic 
altruist’s WTP for increases in children’s safety. 
 
 
4.2 Impure altruism: 
 
Now I consider the situation where parents derive a benefit that depends on the amount of 
contribution they make towards their child’s utility or safety. There are numerous reasons why 
this may be the case.  Suppose that parents derive utility not from how safe their kids are, but 
from the actions they take to make them safer.  Any parent who has found themselves worrying 
not only about whether their child is safe, but about whether they have taken the right steps to 
insure their safety knows what I mean here. Having your child suffer from an accident feels bad, 
but knowing that you could have done something to prevent that suffering, and failed to do it, 
feels even worse.  Or, suppose that parents get utility when other people see that they have taken 
“proper” steps to ensure the safety of their children, or disutility when others see they have 
neglected something.   
These sorts of feelings may not be uncommon. Andreoni (1988) shows that giving to 
charities cannot be explained without this “warm glow” motive, and work by Palfrey and 
Prisbrey (1997) show in an experimental setting that it is a far more important motivation than 
pure altruism is for giving to strangers. Harbaugh (1998) argues that public recognition of these 
gifts are important motivations as well. Our question is how, if at all, WTP for safety that is 
motivated by warm glow should be used for government decision making.  
There are two very different possible issues here. The first is Kahneman and Knetsch’s 
(1992) argument that the warm glow motive may explain people’s responses to contingent 
valuation (CV) studies. That is, when people are asked if they would be WTP $20 to reduce a 




know they get a warm glow from contributing. Kahneman and Knetsch give a convincing 
argument that if this motive is in fact behind CV responses, these responses do not represent 
WTP in the usual sense.  
But, that is not to say that impure altruism should be ignored.  Suppose that the 
experimental results on strangers also apply to adult’s altruistic feelings toward children: it’s 
their contribution to children’s safety, not the overall amount of safety the children have, that 
matters to the adults. Now consider a program that would solicit donations from adults and use 
the money to improve child safety. The “warm glow” motive would obviously lead to an 
additional benefit of such a program, beyond the safety improvement itself, and ignoring this 
additional benefit could lead policy makers to incorrect decisions. 
The difficulty arises when trying to take measures of WTP from an altruist that are in part 
based on warm glow and then using those measures the determine the benefits of policies that do 
not provide the same warm glow. For example, suppose we estimate WTP by looking at 
contributions to a charity that promotes children’s safety, and then use these estimates to 
determine the benefit of adopting a policy that will provide similar amounts of safety but be 
funded by taxation. Since taxes are involuntary, there presumably is no warm glow associated 
with paying them, and we will have overestimated the benefits of the policy. On the other hand, 
voting for such a policy, and the associated tax increase, is a voluntary act that presumably does 
create some warm glow benefits. In fact, it’s quite possible that people might get some benefit 
from paying a tax to provide a benefit to others even if that tax is involuntary. 
These sorts of possibilities obviously raise many questions. To my knowledge there is 
virtually no work on their theoretical implications for how WTP should be used.  Similarly, there 






 While I have argued that theory does not say that the appropriate level of safety is 
obtained simply by equating the sum of own, parental and societal WTP for a child’s safety to 




provided a level of safety that exceeds the amount that would be optimal if we looked only at 
their own WTP.  
My first arguments were made from the position of a social planner, and ignored the 
possibility of altruistic preferences. Instead I relied on the argument that children’s safety choices 
suffer from failures that must be corrected, in order to achieve the efficient level of safety. I 
began with the evidence that very young children do not take death as seriously as adults do. 
Since death is permanent and they do not realize that their preferences will change, children will 
under-invest in safety. Second, even once children reach an adult understanding of death, they 
cannot borrow against future earnings. This market imperfection leads them to under-invest in 
safety. Third, adolescents are notorious for taking extraordinary risks with their health and 
safety, by the standards of adults. If they do not understand that their risk aversion will drop 
substantially as they get older, they may commit to patterns of behavior now that are not optimal. 
Along similar lines, even if children could borrow, their discount rates are higher than the rates 
they will have as adults. If they take their current discount rates as permanent, they will again 
under-invest in safety.  
All these problems can be seen as market failures which lead children to purchase too 
little safety, and which should be corrected by government policies that provide additional 
amounts. Similarly, they lead to children’s own reported or observed WTP for safety to be lower 
than what is optimal. When considering optimal levels of such publicly provided forms of safety 
as a clean environment, this means that the usual rule, to  provide the public good in a quantity 
that sets the sum of WTP equal to marginal cost, will lead to too little provision of children’s 
safety.  I believe that one empirical approach that might produce more useful  estimates of the 
correct WTP would be to use estimates of own WTP for safety from adults, and apply them to 
children. 
I then turned to the question of altruism. It is obvious that parents, and to a presumably 
lesser extent non-related adults are willing to pay money to reduce children’s morbidity and 
mortality. However, it is not so obvious how this WTP should be counted when determining 
whether a given policy should be adopted.  The reason for this is that if we count altruist’s WTP 
for safety, while ignoring their WTP for other things (for example, education), society will 
provide children with more safety and less of the other goods than is optimal. I argued that 




other adults for safety in a measure of the benefits of children’s safety.  First, if the altruism is 
paternalistic, WTP for safety should be counted.  It would seem relatively simple to design CV 
studies that would determine to what extent the altruistic preferences of parent’s and non-related 
adults toward children are specifically directed toward safety. 
A second reason for why altruist’s WTP matters is that, even with non-paternalistic or 
benevolent altruism, safety transfers may be cheaper than cash transfers, and that for this reason 
it may be optimal, in a second best sense, to consider altruist’s WTP for safety. I argue that the 
informational requirements necessary to do this correctly are likely to be quite high, but of 
course that does not mean this should be ignored. 
Another complication is impure altruism.  I argue that there is substantial evidence that 
this is an important reason for charitable contributions to public goods, and that this suggests it is 
almost certainly an important part of the WTP by non-related adults for children’s safety, if not 
for parents.  Properly accounting for this sort of WTP in policy considerations requires a good 
understanding not only of WTP, but of how that WTP differs for different payment vehicles such 
as voluntary contributions and mandatory taxation. Again, this sort of information will require 
substantial empirical work of a new sort in order to correctly incorporate this motive.   
To conclude, it is clear that there are many convincing reasons, well grounded in 
economic theory and common sense, for why a child’s own WTP for safety improvements that 
reduce mortality and morbidity will be an underestimate of the social WTP for safety. The 
preferences of altruistic parents and other relatives, and of unrelated but still concerned adults, 
surely matter for determining what portion of it’s resources society should devote to children. 
However, there are good reasons why the optimal amount to spend on children’s safety cannot be 
found simply by adding up the WTP for safety of the various interested parties. Accurate 
measures of the social benefits of policies that increase children’s health will require more than  
just measures of children’s own preferences for safety and the altruistic preferences of their 
parents and of society at large.  In this paper I have argued that we will also need measures of 
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